WATER IQC

Integrated Water and
Coastal Resources Management


JORDAN WATER STRATEGY

BACKGROUND
PROJECT OBJECTIVES
CURRENT STATUS
Start Date: July 27, 2001 End Date: September 30, 2001
Ceiling Price: $ Contract Number: OUT-LAG-I-805-99-00017-00

The Physical Challenge of Water Inadequacies: Looking at the Numbers

Overview of Available Water Resources. The sources of water currently available to Jordan, not including the very expensive to construct and difficult and expensive-to-operate desalination of seawater, include: renewable groundwater, the reliable safe yield from its surface waters, extraction of fossil groundwater, and additional surface water shared or transferred from its neighbors, Syria and Israel. The reclamation and reuse of wastewater is an important and necessary addition to that list. For the foreseeable future, mega-schemes such as the construction of conduits, with power generators and desalination plants, from the Mediterranean or Red Seas to the Dead Sea, or the import of water from non-neighboring nations, are believed to require massive billion dollar investments that may not be available for a country with Jordan’s limited economic resources.

Water Availability. The Ministry’s estimates of water availability are leveling off, climbing slightly to about 1,250 MCM/year by 2020. In the early years, before some of the new planned works come on line, the deficit is being met by overdrafts from groundwater sources. These overdrafts are currently estimated at about 150 MCM/year, but MWI plans to eliminate them by about 2020. However, the estimates of total availability are probably understated, as they assume that only 200 MCM/year of reclaimed wastewater will be available for reuse. This Report has concluded that the wastewater available for reuse will be closer to 320 MCM/year than the 200 MCM/yr estimated by MWI, so total water availability may be about 1,370 MCM/year.

Water Demands. The Ministry’s estimates of water demands in 2020 indicate steady increases for all categories of users. The future estimates of municipal water demands seem fairly reasonable. They are based on increases in population, decreases in unaccounted-for-water (UFW), and increases in per capita water use. The only concern about these municipal estimates is whether the per capita usage increases for future needs may be too modest. The industrial water demands were estimated to increase by about 80% over the next 20 years, about the same as the overall increase in population for that period, so estimates of future industrial use seem reasonable. The major concern relates to MWI’s forecast irrigation demand, which was estimated to increase from a current level of about 620 MCM/year up to 900 MCM/year. This appears to be contrary to the policy of assigning priority to municipal water demands. Using the MWI’s 2020 estimates, the total demands are about 1,650 MCM/yr, yielding a deficit of about 400 MCM/yr. It also is necessary to keep in mind that future estimates of the amount of water needed to provide users with selected design levels of water per person are based on ambitious programs of reducing current levels of unaccounted-for-water from over 50% down to 25%, and that it will require a major and continuing effort to achieve this.

MWI Per Capita Water Estimates. The Ministry’s projection of 2020 water demands are based on increasing the amount of water delivered to its residents, from about 80 lpcd in 1995, to 155 lpcd in 2020. This Report estimates that less than 100 lpcd (from 84 to 95 lpcd) is currently delivered to the average resident (which is believed to be somewhat greater than the amount billed). The amounts produced by the water utilities to achieve those goals depend upon the efficiencies of the delivery systems. The estimates assumed overall delivery rates ranging from 65% in 2000 to 85% in 2020. The latter rate is believed to be optimistic but achievable. This overall rate assumes that none of the physical losses and 1/4 of the non-physical losses reach the customer. Assuming non-physical and physical losses to be equal, the 65% delivery rate assumes a UFW rate of 55%, and the 85 % rate, a UFW of 25%.

Suggested Per Capita Water Use Design Rates. This Report suggests that average deliveries in the order of 200 lpcd are more appropriate, but is willing to accept 155 lpcd as marginally acceptable, with future increases to be provided. However, two factors must be taken into account. First, these figures overstate the water available to the average person resident in the community because they include allowances for commercial businesses, hotels, public buildings and government offices, hospitals, schools and universities, restaurants, police and military establishments, industries connected to the water system and other non-residential customers. This can be a very substantial amount, particularly in the capital city. That brings up the second factor: the design rate for Greater Amman should be much higher than for other cities, as water needs are invariably greater for the capital cities of countries. It is suggested that a design production rate of about 250 lpcd would be more appropriate for Amman, and 100 to 200 lpcd for villages and larger cities. An average design production criteria for cities outside Amman of 175 lpcd is suggested.

Alternative Estimate of Demands. Assuming that Greater Amman and other communities have different water requirements, this Report’s findings suggests a revision of MWI’s 2020 total water demands as noted in the box below. The MWI estimates of 2020 demands, that presume a deficit of 398 MCM/yr, are taken from Table 9 in the report. The Municipal amounts are based on a population of 9.3 million, 155 lpcd delivered at an efficiency of 85% (UFW of 25%), and 181 lpcd produced The estimates for “Report-2020” are taken from Table 10 in the Report and assume a 2020 population in Amman of 3.3 million, and a production rate of 250 lpcd, and a population of 6.0 for all other communities, with a production rate of 175 lpcd. Based on the same overall delivery efficiency and UFW rates noted above, this translates to 210 lpcd delivered in Amman, and 150 lpcd delivered in other communities. MWI’s Industrial usage estimate was retained, and the Report’s allowance for Irrigation was based on the balance between the estimated availability of 1,370 MCM/yr and the municipal and industrial demands. This still allows a level of irrigated agriculture equal to its current situation, taking into account expected efficiency increases in delivery. The 2000 level of 617 MCM/yr provides 247 MCM/yr at the current estimated overall efficiency of about 40%, while the 550 MCM/yr provides 275 MCM/yr at the target efficiency rate of 50%. The MWI-2000 figures were estimates prepared in 1998. Actual municipal water use was only 241 MCM/yr, so this provided an average of only 84 lpcd for the 5.1 million people living in Jordan, assuming a delivery rate of 65% (UFW of 55%).

Present Allocation of Water Supplies. MWI’s estimate of water supply, shown in the box below, is based on the current over-pumping rate of about 100 MCM/yr from existing developed groundwater sources, and 61 MCM/yr from fossil groundwater.

Future Allocation of Water Resources. Currently, of their total use of 617 MCM/yr for irrigation, farmers use 228 MCM/yr from groundwater, 304 MCM/yr from surface water, and only 85 MCM/yr (14%) from reclaimed wastewater. The proportion of the latter source must be greatly increased by2020, if municipal demands are to be met. The table in the inset box above shows how MWI expects the sources to be allocated (resulting in unfulfilled demands), as taken from Table 9 of the Report, and how this Report believes the water might be more properly allocated, as taken from table 10 of the Report. This Report suggests that there be no desalination of seawater up to 2020. All forms of groundwater and surface water have been combined for simplicity. Note that the MWI estimates of availability assume there are inadequate water resources to meet the estimated 2020 demands.

The Socio-Political Challenges of Water Inadequacies: Getting the Philosophy Right

Approximate Comparisons—Resource Availability. MWI estimates total 2020 “ultimate” source capacity at about 1,260 MCM/yr, but this only includes 200 MCM/yr for wastewater reuse. This Report’s studies indicate that the amounts of wastewater available for reuse are expected to be greater than this. The total industrial (excluding effluent where wastewater is reused) and municipal wastewater expected to be generated in 2020 is about 570 790 MCM/yr of municipal and industrial water produced x 85% delivered x 85% discharged as treated wastewater.MCM/yr. Assuming 70% of this is collected and treated, and further assuming only about 80% of these wastewaters would be in convenient locations or of a quality suitable for agricultural application, the amount of wastewater likely to be available for irrigation reuse was estimated to be about 320 MCM/yr. This increases the Report’s estimate of resource availability to 1,370 MCM/yr.

Approximate Comparisons—Estimated Future Demands. MWI’s estimates of demands seem low for municipal and high for irrigation. Their estimate of 2020 demands (1,658 MCM/yr) exceeds their total estimate of 2020 availability (1,260 MCM/yr). This Report’s estimate of demands increases municipal water and decreases irrigation estimates, and suggests a level of 1,370 MCM/yr, which matches the Report’s estimate of supply availability. While the 550 MCM/yr quantity available for irrigation in 2020 is lower than that currently available, the estimated increase in delivery efficiency, from 40% now to 50% in 2020, more than balances the amount of water available for the crops.

The Current Policy of Requiring Advanced Wastewater Treatment Creates Problems

The Bias Against Stabilization Pond Technology. It is clear that there is strong and widespread local opinion that stabilization ponds do not function in Jordan. The bias probably arises at least partly from the relatively poor results achieved from the seven existing facilities using such wastewater stabilization pond (WSP) technology, particularly the As-Samra facility in Amman. What is troubling is that the causes of the problems and possible means of rehabilitating them to achieve better performance have essentially been ignored in the decision to construct activated sludge plants. Substandard performance is not surprising, given some of the obvious problems of severe hydraulic and organic overloading, and poor designs. Yet, the climatic conditions in Jordan seem ideal for the technology, and WSPs have been used successfully in many similar areas, including Egypt, Oman and other arid areas. The great advantages of WSP technology are its relatively low capital cost, and its ease and low cost of operation and maintenance. The disadvantages are the relatively large land requirements and its limitations in the quality of effluent it produces.

The Implications of Converting to Advanced Treatment Technology. There are 17 existing wastewater treatment facilities in Jordan, and two new ones are coming on line this year. Seven use WSP technology and the others are mostly variations of activated sludge or other secondary treatment technologies. No capital cost data are available, but MWI reported on O&M costs in 2000. Median operating costs of the higher technology facilities reported by MWI was 3.5 times that of the WSP facilities, but the actual gap – once proper maintenance is provided – is expected to be even greater. As WAJ may not have the skills needed to operate the new activated sludge plants coming on line, they intend to subcontract their operation to the private sector (see next page). The driving force behind the use of advanced treatment technology, for upgrading existing plants and building new ones, is the intention to provide a quality of effluent suitable for its “unrestricted” use for irrigation. Proposed pricing for the use of such waters is well below the cost of providing it. At this time, about 85 MCM/yr of wastewater effluent is used for irrigation, but the charges are very low (JD 0.010 per CM, or 1.4 cents/CM). The median cost of O&M for an activated sludge facility in the MWI year 20000 operations report was about JD 0.180, or 18 times the charge to the farmer. Newer, properly maintained plants are expected to cost considerably more to operate. A Net Present Value (NPV) analysis was conducted of a comparison of two sample 68,500 CM/day (25 MCM/yr) wastewater facilities, one using WSP and the other AS technology, based on the actual median cost of O&M for these two technologies in Jordan in 2000, and a 20 year operating period. Even if the capital cost difference (estimated at JD 9 M for WSP and JD 24 M for AS) is ignored, the higher O&M costs of AS facilities result in its NPV being over JD 50 M greater than that of a WSP facility. Taking capital costs into account, the difference is close to JD 70 M. The study also indicated that the utility would have to charge its customers an average of about JD 0.10/CM for WSP wastewater and JD 0.30.CM for AS wastewater in the early years of the project. Such high cost differentials warrant a hard look at MWI’s current policy.

Although Water Sources are Limited and Expensive, Water is Not Being Used Effectively

Distribution of Water to Municipalities is Very Inefficient. Unaccounted-for-water (UFW) is the difference between the amount of water that enters the system and the amount metered or estimated to be used by the customers and for which they are billed. The last detailed study of UFW in Amman indicated that it was in the order of 50%. MWI’s estimates for all its water systems place current average UFW levels at about 52%. It seems likely that neither the total production nor the total amount billed is based on accurate meter readings, so these are only approximate estimates. Neither is there any hard data on what proportion of the UFW is attributable to physical losses and what to non-physical losses, as defined below.

Components of Unaccounted-for-Water. UFW has two componentsphysical losses (leakage) and non-physical, which includes a range of factors from illegal connections, to under-registration of meters, to illegal or erroneous bookkeeping and other factors. High UFW rates create two problems: Expensive and limited water is wasted and does not reach the customer, and MWI suffers financially because it cannot bill and collect revenue for the water it paid to develop and produce. The least expensive water available to MWI to provide to its customers is the water saved by reducing UFW levels to a more reasonable level of about 25%.

Distribution of Irrigation Water to Farmers is Inefficient. The World Bank noted that irrigated agriculture has increased nearly five-fold in the past 25 years. There are limited studies of the overall efficiency of the delivery and use of irrigation water. The two components to measure are the efficiency of the conveyance system from the water source to the thousands of farm gates, and the application efficiency within the farms, of how effectively water is applied to the crops. While the efficiency of major conveyors is believed to be relatively high, there are doubts about the many, smaller secondary systems from the main conveyors to the farm gates. The former may be in the 80-90% ranges (as two studies showed) but the latter are believed to be closer to 60%. On-farm, studies indicate that only 50% of the water received is effectively applied. Recent studies indicate that up to 20% of this water can be saved with better techniques. In the absence of hard data, the Report estimates that overall irrigation efficiencies might be as low as 40%. The unrealistically low prices for irrigation water provide limited incentive to improve on-farm efficiencies, but clearly the combination of large volumes of water used and low efficiencies make this a prime target for implementing improvements.

The Potential Impacts of the Proposed Increase in PSP Contracts

The current direction of MWI policy and practices appears to be to assign responsibility for operation and maintenance of water and wastewater utilities to private sector companies. This has already been done for Greater Amman, and the country is believed to be planning to select a PSP operator for all sector utilities in the four northern governorates. There is also discussion of extending the program to the southern region and to the rest of the central region. The As-Samra wastewater treatment plant is also currently being targeted for PSP contract operation, partly as a funding requirement but also since the skill requirements may be beyond the capability of WAJ. The major Amman PSP contract is being supervised by a handful of expatriate management staff, but the great majority of tasks are performed by Jordanians. The Report suggests that a detailed study be undertaken to evaluate the financial, social and other impacts of this rapid expansion of PSP contracting, and to consider alternatives for providing effective operation at lower cost for most water and wastewater utilities. PSP can be very effective, and may be desirable, but MWI should be aware of the consequences, financial and otherwise, of the large-scale use of PSP, and should be provided with policy guidelines on when and how to use it.

Comments on the JICA-Funded Water Sector Management Master Plan

The JICA-funded master plan has been issued in draft versions of January 2001 and August 2001, and the final version is to be issued later this year. It provides an excellent compilation of a large amount of useful data about the sector in one reference. However, the review of the draft plan raises a few questions. For example, one question concerns the point that, while the plan assumes that demands will be managed to remain within the amount of water expected to be available, little specific guidance is given to what steps the Ministry should take to manage the demands. Once the master plan is issued in its final form, it should be reviewed to determine what, if any, additional analysis might be required. Depending upon the results of that review, USAID should consider funding such possible additions.

Affordability and Cost RecoveryPrices Charged for Water are Too Low

The residential water tariff is based on a cross-subsidy policy to support the basic health and hygiene needs of the poor. However, it is believed that more than two thirds of the population in Amman pay less than JD 10 per cycle (three months), or JD 3.30/month. A family of five people living in Amman that consumes 120 lpcd and is connected to the sewer system pays about JD 17/cycle, or JD 5.70/mo. This is equivalent to about five liters of bottled water, or five to six packs of local cigarettes per month. That cost is only about 2% of a family income of JD 300/month.

The Existing Institutional Capacity of the Water Sector is Inadequate

World Bank Assessment The World Bank, in a comprehensive review of the water sector in 1997, and again in a 2001 update, concluded that the combination of the MWI, WAJ and JVA had many critical deficiencies that prevent the identification and implementation of efficient and sustainable solutions to achievement of its responsibilities. The Bank’s key findings on deficiencies included:

  1. Fragmented and short-term planning in the water sector,
  2. Tendency to focus on expanding supply rather than managing demand,
  3. Polarization of water management between irrigation and urban water uses, and
  4. Inefficiencies in providing services, resulting in a serious waste of resources, large subsidies, a loss of consumer confidence, and an increasing national fiscal burden.

In reviewing the problems in Jordan’s water sector, the Bank’s assessment concluded that:

Need for a Detailed Assessment and Strengthening Plan

The Bank’s findings repeated those of a detailed, CIDA-funded study in 1995 (only 5% of whose recommendations were implemented) and were confirmed by the findings of this Report. Unless the water sector in Jordan is reorganized and strengthened, the remaining projects related to the development of resources and the provision of services cannot be adequately implemented and maintained on a sustainable basis. This view is so strongly held by the authors of this Report that they suggest that restructuring and strengthening of the new organization become the primary priority for the next USAID assistance program. The proposed assessment should address how best to provide the sector with needed autonomy, what type of legislation may be required, alternatives for maximizing autonomy, provisions for regulation, decentralization of the delivery of sector services, support (major repairs, laboratories, technical guidance) services for the decentralized facilities, and many other institutional issues. The assessment should include recommendations for overcoming deficiencies and provision of new organizational entities, and, above all, it should include a detailed action plan describing specific steps to achieve its implementation. Once the plan has been thoroughly reviewed by the GOJ, and agreement reached on which recommendation alternatives to adopt, it should be followed by strengthening activities (training, equipment, commodities, development of procedures) over a period of several years. Institutional strengthening works, but only with the full cooperation of the host-country organization and its key staff, and a sustained effort by the donor to provide the assistance needed over several years.

Alternative Plan for Institutional Strengthening

Should the full periods and amounts of funding presently expected from the USAID program for 2002-2006 not be available, for whatever reasons, USAID should consider modifying the program. One suggested modification is to utilize short-term technical assistance programs to adapt documents recently developed by USAID in Bosnia & Herzegovina for the guidance of water and wastewater utilities in strengthening their capacities in the full range of activities normally required of san effective water and wastewater operating utility. These could be adapted for use in Jordan.

 

   

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